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Abstract 
Petri nets are used in this paper to estimate the indirect consequences of accidents in a railway network, which belongs to the 
class of the so-called transportation Critical Infrastructures (CIs), that is, those assets consisting of systems, resources and/or 
processes whose total or partial destruction, or even temporarily unavailability, has the effect of significantly weakening the 
functioning of the system. In the proposed methodology, a timed Petri ne<t represents the railway network and the trains 
travelling over the rail lines; such a net also includes some places and some stochastically-timed transitions that are used to 
model the occurrence of unexpected events (accidents, disruptions, and so on) that make some resources of the network (tracks, 
blocks, crossovers, overhead line, electric power supply, etc.) temporarily unavailable. The overall Petri net is a live and bounded 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) that can be analyzed by exploiting the steady-state probabilities of a continuous-time 
Markov chain (CTMC) that can be derived from the reachability graph of the GSPN. The final target of such an analysis is to 
determine and rank the levels of criticality of transportation facilities and assess the vulnerability of the whole railway network. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 20th EURO Working Group on Transportation Meeting. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, the interest of institutions, managers, enterprises, and researchers has been focused on 
improving the safety and security levels of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). In particular, as regards transportation 
systems, the interest about this topic has grown due not only to the potentially very high number of people killed or 
injured when an incident or accident occurs (direct losses), but also to the high costs and the large amount of time 
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needed in many cases to restore the infrastructure (indirect losses). Moreover, the main characteristic that makes CI 
safety and security a particularly important problem to tackle with is the mutual interdependence of their 
components whose operation depends on the proper functioning of all the others; this is especially true in railway 
networks where the occurrence of unexpected accidental events (hereafter referred to as safety or failure events) 
makes some resources of the network (tracks, blocks, crossovers, overhead line, electric power supply, etc.) 
temporarily unavailable, with consequences that are in some cases amplified by the chain-effect phenomenon 
resulting from the interdependency of resources. A methodology to assess the consequences of failures in a railway 
network is presented in this paper; it is based on Petri Nets (PNs), which have been proven to be a valuable and 
powerful modelling tool to represent and analyze the behavior of discrete event systems, as they are able to capture 
the precedence relations and interactions among the concurrent and asynchronous events typical of such systems. 
While for specific literature relevant to security and safety of critical infrastructures the reader may refer to Lewis 
(2006) and Macaulay (2008), the problem of assessing the criticality of infrastructures has been faced in Arulselvan 
et al. (2009), where an approach based on the graph theory is proposed to detect the most critical nodes in large 
networks. Although the graph theory appears to be a suitable tool for such analyses, Petri Nets may represent a better 
modelling formalism, being capable to model in a unique framework different kinds of dynamics and to easily model 
concurrency and synchronism of different events, often in a modular way. In this framework, an interesting 
application of PNs to infrastructure interdependence analysis is described in Gursesli and Desrochers (2003) where 
different kinds of critical infrastructures are modelled in a unique framework and some considerations about 
interdependence of CIs are provided by applying the analysis of PN structural properties (Murata, 1989). In addition, 
the “intrinsic modularity” of PNs is useful whenever a large network of different kinds of infrastructures has to be 
considered, such as, for instance, an electric power distribution network and a railway transportation network. For 
what concerns the modelling capabilities of PNs in the field of transportation engineering, they have been put into 
evidence by the relevant vast literature. For the cases of highway networks or urban transportation networks, readers 
can refer, for instance, to Tolba et al. (2005) and Di Febbraro et al. (2016). Instead, for the case of railway systems 
here considered, it can be mentioned the works of Ren and Zhou (1995), Fanti et al. (2006), Hagalisetto et al. (2007), 
Giua and Seatzu (2008), Ricci (2009), and Liu et al. (2016). Recently, in Giglio and Sacco (2016) a very detailed 
Petri Net representation of a railway traffic system has been proposed, with the aim of providing a comprehensive 
model to be used for analysis, optimization, and control purposes. In this paper, that model is taken into account to 
analyze the CIs characterizing the railway network and assess the level of criticality of failure events. 
The level of criticality of a safety or failure event which affects one or more transportation facility is here 
considered as the product of a value representing the impact of the occurrence of the event on the system’s operation   
with the probability of being in a state which is affected by the event. This is consistent with the classic definition of 
risk. In general, the impact is assessed through the computation of a weighted sum of the estimations of some losses 
(both direct and indirect) caused by the occurrence of the event. In the proposed Petri net-based approach, the 
impact of a certain failure event will be determined directly by means of the reachability graph of the generalized 
stochastic Petri net (GSPN) representing the railway network, whereas the probability of occurrence of the event 
will be calculated through the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) that can be derived from the GSPN taking 
into account the tangible states of the reachability graph, the firing rates of exponentially-timed transitions, and the 
stochastic switches associated with immediate transitions. 
2. The railway network and the adopted Petri net model 
The proposed Petri net-based model of a railway network consists of two interconnected PNs that represent, 
respectively, the physical part of the network (stations, blocks, crossovers, tracks, and so on, as well as the rolling 
stock moving on the network) and the logical part of it (train schedule over the available lines). A sketch of a railway 
network with 7 stations and 8 railways is reported in Fig. 1(a), whereas in Fig. 1(b) the overall PN model is 
illustrated. The two nets have been described in detail in Giglio and Sacco (2016), to which the reader can refer for 
more details on the modelling approach. The extension presented in this paper is aimed at representing the 
occurrence of accidents, disruptions, and other unexpected events that make some resources of the network 
unavailable; this is done by including in the Timed Petri Net (TPN) modelling the physical part of the system some 
places and some stochastically-timed transitions whose firings model such failure events; the resulting net is the 
 Angela Di Febbraro  et al. / Transportation Research Procedia 27 (2017) 553–560 555
 A. Di Febbraro, D. Giglio, N. Sacco / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) 000–000 3 
“extended” TPN depicted in Fig. 1(b) which is actually a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net. Since the proposed 
methodology to determine the levels of criticality of transportation facilities requires that the GSPN is live and 
bounded, a Petri net supervisor is employed to model real railway operational constraints so that the reach of some 
states is prevented (in particular, deadlock states); nevertheless, due to the lack of space, such a net is not described 
in this paper. Besides, also the logical part of the overall PN model, including the PN actuator, is not considered here 
as it is not strictly pertinent to the research presented in this paper. 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) A railway network with 7 stations and 8 railways. (b) Schematization of the overall Petri net model. 
2.1. The extended TPN of the physical part 
The representation of failure events in the railway network is briefly illustrated in the following by means of the 
PN reported in Fig. 2, which models a block section within a railway. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Petri net model of a block section with failure events (red transitions). 
In such a net, places from 𝑝𝑝" to 𝑝𝑝"" (resp., from 𝑝𝑝"# to 𝑝𝑝##) and transitions from 𝑡𝑡" to 𝑡𝑡"% (resp., from 𝑡𝑡"& to 𝑡𝑡'() 
model the left (resp., right) track of the double-track railway section, whereas places 𝑝𝑝#'-𝑝𝑝#) and transitions 𝑡𝑡'*-𝑡𝑡'% 
model the physical availability of the block section. With regards to the left track, a northbound train is represented 
by a token which enters 𝑝𝑝" and reaches 𝑝𝑝) by passing through either 𝑡𝑡#-𝑝𝑝#-𝑡𝑡) (in case of reduced speed) or 𝑡𝑡'-𝑝𝑝'-𝑡𝑡+ 
(nominal speed). Transitions 𝑡𝑡* and 𝑡𝑡% model a train failure (for instance due to an engine failure) which occurs 
when the train is travelling the block section, and 𝑡𝑡& represents the repair process which makes the train able to 
restart its travel; 𝑡𝑡* , 𝑡𝑡% , and 𝑡𝑡&  are timed transitions whose firing time is distributed exponentially in order to 
properly model the randomness of the (memoryless) fault events. Analogous considerations can be made for a 
southbound train (the token representing the train flows from 𝑝𝑝* to 𝑝𝑝", and for the part of the net relevant to the 
right track. An accident involving the whole block section (such as, for instance, a mudslide) is modelled through 
the firing of 𝑡𝑡'* which moves the token in 𝑝𝑝#' to 𝑝𝑝#); in such a marking, the absence of a token in 𝑝𝑝#' prevents the 
firing of immediate transitions 𝑡𝑡", 𝑡𝑡",, 𝑡𝑡"&, and 𝑡𝑡#% which means that trains cannot enter the disrupted block section 
until it is repaired (the repair process is represented through the firing of 𝑡𝑡'% which put back the token to 𝑝𝑝#'). 
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Fig. 3. Representation of a failure event affecting the overhead line with Petri nets. 
As discussed in the introduction, in a critical infrastructure some resources depend on the proper availability of 
some other resources; for example, in a railway network, the block and crossover sections constituting a railway line 
are available only if the overhead line provides power to the railway line; in other words, a failure event affecting the 
overhead line prevents the execution of any travel activity on the involved block and crossover sections. In the 
proposed model, this is represented with the Petri net structure illustrated in Fig. 3. In such a part of the whole 
“extended TPN”, the considered failure event is modelled through the firing of 𝑡𝑡)# which put 𝑛𝑛 tokens to 𝑝𝑝#& (𝑛𝑛 is 
the number of blocks and crossovers connected to the overhead line); due to the arcs between the portion of the net 
in the left part of Fig. 3 (which actually represents the physical availability of block sections powered by the 
overhead line) and 𝑝𝑝#&, 𝑡𝑡)', and 𝑝𝑝'" in the right part, the tokens in 𝑝𝑝#& and the firings of immediate transition 𝑡𝑡)' 
remove all tokens from the left part, making all the block sections no longer available until the line is restored (this 
happens when 𝑡𝑡)) fires and the token is put back to 𝑝𝑝#%). In a similar way, it is possible to model the dependency of 
the overhead lines from an electric power supply which provides power to a subset of adjacent overhead lines; in this 
case, an electric power failure impedes any connected overhead line to properly work. 
3. On determining the levels of criticality of transportation facilities 
The level of criticality of a certain transportation resource or facility is determined from the Petri net model 
described in the previous section; in particular, the reachability graph is used to assess the impact of a certain failure 
event, and the continuous-time Markov chain that can be derived from the reachability graph is used to determine 
the probability of occurrence of the event. The impact and the probability of occurrence of a certain event lead to the 
determination of the level of the relevant criticality. In this connection, let a failure event 𝑒𝑒/ , ℎ = 1, 2, … , be 
described by the markings of places that characterize the states after the occurrences of the event; as an example, 
with reference to the part of the net represented in Fig. 3, the event “overhead line failure” is characterized by the 
absence of a token in 𝑝𝑝#% and by the presence of one or more tokens in 𝑝𝑝#& or one token in 𝑝𝑝',; thus it can be 
defined as 𝑒𝑒" = 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝#% = 0 ∧ 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝#& > 1 ∨ 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝', = 1 . Giving the reachability graph 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and being 𝑀𝑀>  the 
generic marking of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, the set of markings of the graph in which the failure event 𝑒𝑒/ is active is defined as 
 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒/ = 𝑀𝑀> ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅	|	𝑀𝑀> ∩ 𝑒𝑒/ ≠ ∅  (1) 
Then, the impact of the failure event 𝑒𝑒/ is 
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being card 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒/  the number of markings of the reachability graph in which the event is active and card 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅  
the number of markings of the reachability graph. Moreover, giving the continuous-time Markov chain 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (it is 
determined taking into account the tangible states of the reachability graph, the firing rates of exponentially-timed 
transitions, and the stochastic switches associated with immediate transitions) and being 𝑀𝑀> the generic node of it, 
the probability of occurrence of the failure event 𝑒𝑒/ is 
 Pr 𝑒𝑒/ = Pr 𝑀𝑀>RS∈RT|RS∩MNU∅  (3) 
Finally, the level of criticality of the failure event 𝑒𝑒/ is given by 
 𝑉𝑉 𝑒𝑒/ = Pr 𝑒𝑒/ ∙ 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒/  (4) 
and the vulnerability of the whole railway network is assessed at 
 𝑉𝑉SYS = 𝑉𝑉 𝑒𝑒/MN∈ℰ  (5) 
being ℰ = 𝑒𝑒/, ℎ = 1, 2, …  the set including all the failure events affecting the system. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Petri net modelling the execution of activities for two kinds of clients by means of two partially-shared “local” resources A and B, and 
with the availability of a “global” resource C. 
In order to better explain the proposed methodology, a toy example is taken into account. Let consider the Petri 
net illustrated in Fig. 4, which models a simple system consisting of three resources A, B, and C which are used by 
two kinds of clients, namely clients 1 and clients 2, to carry out some activities (whose duration is exponentially-
distributed). Places 𝑝𝑝"", 𝑝𝑝"#, and 𝑝𝑝"' model the state (availability or non-availability) of resources A, B, and C, 
respectively.  Clients 1 can use either resource A (modelled by the sequence of places and transitions 𝑝𝑝"-𝑡𝑡"-𝑝𝑝#-𝑡𝑡#-
𝑝𝑝() or resource B (sequence 𝑝𝑝"-𝑡𝑡+-𝑝𝑝)-𝑡𝑡(-𝑝𝑝() to perform its activity, whereas clients 2 are allowed to use resource B 
only (sequence 𝑝𝑝*-𝑡𝑡",-𝑝𝑝%-𝑡𝑡""-𝑝𝑝",). All activities need the availability of resource C to start; thus, resource C can be 
considered as a primary “global” resource with respect to the secondary “local” resources A and B. Each activity is 
renewed after its completion; in this connection, transitions 𝑡𝑡& and 𝑡𝑡") represent the renewal processes of activities 
of client 1 and client 2, respectively. It can be noted that such an example is analogous to the case of a block section 
with two parallel tracks, in which trains (clients) 1 can use the two of them, while trains (clients) 2 can use only one. 
A disruption may affect a client when it is using resource A or B; in this case, the involved client keeps the 
resource occupied until it is repaired; once repaired, the client leaves the system and the resource is again available. 
In the net of Fig. 4, disruptions are modelled with exponentially-timed transitions 𝑡𝑡' (for clients of type 1 when 
using resource A), 𝑡𝑡* (again for clients of type 1 but when using resource B), and 𝑡𝑡"# (for clients of type 2). The 
repair activities, which are obviously mandatory when a client suffers a disruption, are respectively modelled with 
exponentially-timed transitions 𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡%, and 𝑡𝑡"'. The primary resource C is also failure-prone; it can suddenly break 
(due to unexpected events) thus preventing the start of any activity on both resource A and B; in the Petri net, the 
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failure of resource C and its consequent repair process are modelled with exponentially-timed transitions 𝑡𝑡"+ and 
𝑡𝑡"(, respectively; besides, the firing of 𝑡𝑡"+ (which moves the token in 𝑝𝑝"' to 𝑝𝑝")) prevents the firing of immediate 
transitions 𝑡𝑡", 𝑡𝑡+, and 𝑡𝑡", that represent the starts of activities. 
It is evident that 4 kinds of failure events affect the system, which are defined as follows: 
• 𝑒𝑒" = 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝' = 1  (disruption of client 1 when using resource A); 
• 𝑒𝑒# = 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝+ = 1  (disruption of client 1 when using resource B); 
• 𝑒𝑒' = 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝& = 1  (disruption of client 2 when using resource B); 
• 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝") = 1  (break down of resource C). 
As a matter of fact, such an example is a simplification of the Petri net model of a block section in a railway and 
therefore can be taken as representative of the considered problem. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Reachability graph of the Petri net illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The reachability graph of the Petri net is illustrated in Fig. 5 and the list of reachable markings is reported in 
Table 1. From the table it results that the sets 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒/ , with ℎ = 1, 2, …, are: 
• 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒" = 𝑀𝑀(,𝑀𝑀"(,𝑀𝑀"*,𝑀𝑀#*,𝑀𝑀#%,𝑀𝑀#&,𝑀𝑀'(,𝑀𝑀'* ; 
• 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒# = 𝑀𝑀&,𝑀𝑀#,,𝑀𝑀'#,𝑀𝑀'% ; 
• 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒' = 𝑀𝑀"#,𝑀𝑀"&,𝑀𝑀#',𝑀𝑀#+,𝑀𝑀#%,𝑀𝑀'",𝑀𝑀'+,𝑀𝑀'* ; 
• 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑀𝑀),𝑀𝑀%,𝑀𝑀",,𝑀𝑀"',𝑀𝑀"+,𝑀𝑀"*,𝑀𝑀#,,𝑀𝑀##,𝑀𝑀#',𝑀𝑀#(,𝑀𝑀#&,𝑀𝑀',,𝑀𝑀'",𝑀𝑀'',𝑀𝑀'),𝑀𝑀'+,𝑀𝑀'(,𝑀𝑀'*,𝑀𝑀'% ; 
which means that the impacts of the failure events are: 
• 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒" = 0.2051; 
• 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒# = 0.1026; 
• 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒' = 0.2051; 
• 𝐼𝐼 𝑒𝑒) = 0.4872. 
In order to compute the steady-state probabilities of being, in a generic time instant, in a certain tangible state of 
the graph, the CTMC associated with the considered GSPN (which is a live and bounded net) is determined. In this 
connection, the firing rates and the stochastic switches reported in Tables 2 and 3 are taken into consideration. 
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Table 1. Markings of the reachability graph of the Petri net illustrated in Fig. 4 (the notation [𝑗𝑗ñM𝑘𝑘 used in the “Next Markings” column means 
that the next marking M𝑘𝑘 is reached by firing transition 𝑡𝑡c). 
Label Marking Next Markings Type 
M0 (1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) [1ñM1 ; [5ñM2 ; [10ñM3 ; [15ñM4 vanishing 
M1 (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) [2ñM5 ; [3ñM6 ; [10ñM7 ; [15ñM8 vanishing 
M2 (0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) [6ñM5 ; [7ñM9 ; [15ñM10 tangible 
M3 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) [1ñM7 ; [11ñM11 ; [12ñM12 ; [15ñM13 vanishing 
M4 (1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1) [16ñM0 tangible 
M5 (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) [9ñM0 ; [10ñM14 ; [15ñM15 vanishing 
M6 (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) [4ñM5 ; [10ñM16 ; [15ñM17 vanishing 
M7 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) [2ñM14 ; [3ñM16 ; [11ñM18 ; [12ñM19 ; [15ñM20 tangible 
M8 (0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) [2ñM15 ; [3ñM17 ; [16ñM1 tangible 
M9 (0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) [8ñM5 ; [15ñM20 tangible 
M10 (0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) [6ñM15 ; [7ñM20 ; [16ñM2 tangible 
M11 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0) [1ñM18 ; [5ñM21 ; [14ñM0 ; [15ñM22 vanishing 
M12 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0) [1ñM19 ; [13ñM11 ; [15ñM23 vanishing 
M13 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1) [11ñM22 ; [12ñM23 ; [16ñM3 tangible 
M14 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) [9ñM3 ; [11ñM24 ; [12ñM25 ; [15ñM26 tangible 
M15 (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1) [9ñM4 ; [16ñM5 tangible 
M16 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) [4ñM14 ; [11ñM27 ; [12ñM28 ; [15ñM29 tangible 
M17 (0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) [4ñM15 ; [16ñM6 tangible 
M18 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0) [2ñM24 ; [3ñM27 ; [14ñM1 ; [15ñM30 tangible 
M19 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0) [2ñM25 ; [3ñM28 ; [13ñM18 ; [15ñM31 tangible 
M20 (0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) [8ñM15 ; [16ñM9 tangible 
M21 (0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0) [6ñM24 ; [7ñM32 ; [14ñM2 ; [15ñM33 tangible 
M22 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1) [14ñM4 ; [16ñM11 tangible 
M23 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) [13ñM22 ; [16ñM12 tangible 
M24 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0) [9ñM11 ; [14ñM5 ; [15ñM34 tangible 
M25 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0) [9ñM12 ; [13ñM24 ; [15ñM35 tangible 
M26 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1) [9ñM13 ; [11ñM34 ; [12ñM35 ; [16ñM14 tangible 
M27 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0) [4ñM24 ; [14ñM6 ; [15ñM36 tangible 
M28 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0) [4ñM25 ; [13ñM27 ; [15ñM37 tangible 
M29 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1) [4ñM26 ; [11ñM36 ; [12ñM37 ; [16ñM16 tangible 
M30 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1) [2ñM34 ; [3ñM36 ; [14ñM8 ; [16ñM18 tangible 
M31 (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) [2ñM35 ; [3ñM37 ; [13ñM30 ; [16ñM19 tangible 
M32 (0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0) [8ñM24 ; [14ñM9 ; [15ñM38 tangible 
M33 (0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1) [6ñM34 ; [7ñM38 ; [14ñM10 ; [16ñM21 tangible 
M34 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1) [9ñM22 ; [14ñM15 ; [16ñM24 tangible 
M35 (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) [9ñM23 ; [13ñM34 ; [16ñM25 tangible 
M36 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1) [4ñM34 ; [14ñM17 ; [16ñM27 tangible 
M37 (0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) [4ñM35 ; [13ñM36 ; [16ñM28 tangible 
M38 (0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1) [8ñM34 ; [14ñM20 ; [16ñM32 tangible 
 
Table 2. Firing rates in the GSPN illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Transition Firing Rate Note 
𝑡𝑡#  𝜇𝜇# = 4	hourh"  service rate 
𝑡𝑡'  𝑓𝑓' = 1	weekh"  failure rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡)  𝑟𝑟) = 0.5	hourh"  repair rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡(  𝜇𝜇( = 6	hourh"  service rate 
𝑡𝑡*  𝑓𝑓* = 1	weekh"  failure rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡%  𝑟𝑟% = 0.5	hourh"  repair rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡&  𝜆𝜆& = 2	hourh"  renewal process rate 
𝑡𝑡""  𝜇𝜇"" = 2	hourh"  service rate 
𝑡𝑡"#  𝑓𝑓"# = 2	weekh"  failure rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡"'  𝑟𝑟"' = 0.5	hourh"  repair rate (disruption) 
𝑡𝑡")  𝜆𝜆") = 1	hourh"  renewal process rate 
𝑡𝑡"+  𝑓𝑓"+ = 1	monthh"  failure rate (breakdown) 
𝑡𝑡"(  𝑟𝑟"( = 2	dayh"  repair rate (breakdown) 
Table 3. Stochastic switches in the GSPN illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Marking Enabled Immediate Transitions Probabilities 
M0 𝑡𝑡" – 𝑡𝑡+ – 𝑡𝑡", 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 
M1 𝑡𝑡",  1 
M3 𝑡𝑡"  1 
M5 𝑡𝑡",  1 
M6 𝑡𝑡",  1 
M11 𝑡𝑡" – 𝑡𝑡+ 0.4 – 0.6 
M12 𝑡𝑡"  1 
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After having built the matrix Q and determined the steady-state probabilities of being in the tangible markings of 
the CTMC (by solving the system of linear equalities πQ = 0 with πuu = 1), the probabilities of occurrence of the 
failure events turn out to be the following ones: 
• Pr 𝑒𝑒" = 2.4501 ∙ 10h'; 
• Pr 𝑒𝑒# = 1.3378 ∙ 10h'; 
• Pr 𝑒𝑒' = 7.6165 ∙ 10h'; 
• Pr 𝑒𝑒) = 1.6393 ∙ 10h#; 
and, consequently, the levels of criticality of the failure events are: 
• V 𝑒𝑒" = 2.4501 ∙ 10h' ∙ 0.2051 = 5.0259 ∙ 10h); 
• V 𝑒𝑒# = 1.3378 ∙ 10h' ∙ 0.1026 = 1.3721 ∙ 10h); 
• V 𝑒𝑒' = 7.6165 ∙ 10h' ∙ 0.2051 = 1.5624 ∙ 10h'; 
• V 𝑒𝑒) = 1.6393 ∙ 10h# ∙ 0.4872 = 7.9865 ∙ 10h'; 
and the vulnerability of the whole railway network is assessed at 𝑉𝑉SYS = 1.0189 ∙ 10h#. In conclusion, the most 
critical failure event among those considered in this toy example is the breakdown of the “global” resource C. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, a methodology to assess, from a quantitative point of view, the accident events that affect a Critical 
Infrastructure has been presented with specific reference to the case of railway networks. The proposed methodology 
is applied to the detailed Petri net representation of the system and exploits the properties of the Generalized 
Stochastic Petri Net, that can be analyzed by means of the Markov chain theory. As future research direction, in 
order to limit some computational troubles in the determination of the reachability graph of the net, an efficient 
building procedure can be defined by exploiting the modularity of the adopted Petri net representation. 
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